






LABOR UNIONS AND CORPORATE CASH HOLDINGS: 




Zhenxu Tong and Hui Huang 
 









Contact information for Zhenxu Tong. Corresponding author. Address: Xfi Centre for 
Finance & Investment, School of Business, University of Exeter, Rennes Drive, Exeter EX4 
4ST, United Kingdom. Telephone: +44 1392 723155. E-mail address: z.tong@exeter.ac.uk. 
Contact information for Hui Huang. Address: Xfi Centre for Finance & Investment, School 
of Business, University of Exeter, Rennes Drive, Exeter EX4 4ST, United Kingdom. 
Telephone: +44 7709 699392. E-mail address: hh337@exeter.ac.uk.  
We would like to thank the journal editors, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at 
the 2017 Frontiers of Business Research in China International Symposium, the 2017 
Financial Management Association European Conference, the 2017 European Financial 
Management Association Annual Meeting, and the 2017 Global Finance Conference for their 












Firms in countries with higher union membership have less corporate cash holdings. This 
negative relationship is stronger for firms in the countries with weaker employment 
protection legislation, for firms in the countries with a higher degree of labor bargaining 
centralization, and for financially constrained firms. Moreover, the market value of corporate 
cash holdings is lower for firms in countries with higher union membership. The number of 
strikes & lockouts is higher in countries with more corporate cash holdings. We conclude that 
firms strategically choose corporate cash holdings to gain the bargaining position with labor 
in the international setting.  
 




Corporate cash holdings occupy an important role in the collective bargaining with labor 
unions around the world. For example, in the US in 2006, the workers in General Motors 
observed that the firm had a cash balance of 20 billion dollars, and claimed that “they hope 
the threat of a strike will prompt GM’s management to dip into its cash reserves to 
compensate them for accepting lower pay and benefits”.
1
 For another example, in South 
Africa in 2016, the labor unions in wage negotiations with South African Airlines (SAA) said 
that they “had revised upwards their wage demands from single digits to 11%‚ after the 
airline's board chair Dudu Myeni said on Friday SAA was financially sound and ‘had 
money’”. After that, the South African Airlines “moved to distance itself from perceptions it 
had sufficient cash to meet high wage demands”.
2
 
In this paper, we examine the relation between the presence of labor unions and 
corporate cash holdings in the international setting.  Our motivation is based on the following 
two perspectives. First, corporate cash holdings have an important role in a firm’s balance 
sheet around the world. For example, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2013) find that in 
2010 the mean of the ratio of cash to assets is 13.49% for the firms in Compustat in 45 
countries. Given such a large magnitude of corporate cash holdings, we believe that it is a 
promising area to examine the relation between labor unions and corporate cash holdings in 
the international setting.  
Second, while Klasa, Maxwell, and Ortiz-Molina (2009) examine the relation 
between corporate cash holdings and labor unions by using the US data, to our knowledge, no 
previous paper has used the international data to study this topic. However, labor union is a 
prevalent phenomenon around the world, and there is substantial difference between US and 
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 Last tango in Detroit? General Motors, Delphi and the unions, The Economist, April 2006, page 70. 
2
 SAA denies wage deadlock during negotiations, Times LIVE, 12 May 2016. The article was available at the 
following website when we wrote the first draft of the paper.  
http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2016/05/12/SAA-denies-wage-deadlock-during-negotiations 
A PDF copy of the article is available from the authors upon request. 
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other countries in the world. For example, Visser (2006) examines the data of labor unions in 
the international setting. He finds that in 2001 the union density ranges from 8.1% to 78.0% 
in 24 countries. Among them, the union density in the US is 12.8%, ranked at the 22nd place. 
It implies that there is a significant difference between the US data and the international data 
in terms of unionization rates.  
If we think of the distribution of union density around the world as a spectrum, US 
is at the lower end of the spectrum. Therefore, the previous findings by Klasa, Maxwell, and 
Ortiz-Molina (2009) reveal the bargaining role of corporate cash holdings at the lower end of 
the spectrum. However, we still do not know the relation between corporate cash holdings 
and labor unions in the middle part and higher end of the spectrum. In this case, it provides us 
a good opportunity to examine the relation between labor unions and corporate cash holdings 
by using the international data, because this allows us to provide more comprehensive 
evidence based on a more complete distribution of union density around the world. 
We develop two hypotheses. First, the bargaining hypothesis argues that with the 
presence of stronger labor unions, a firm will strategically hold a lower level of corporate 
cash holdings to increase a firm’s bargaining position with labor unions, because this can 
make a more credible case that the risk of liquidity shortages would be exacerbated by 
granting additional concessions to the labor unions. Second, the operating leverage 
hypothesis argues that since stronger labor unions increase the rigidity of labor costs, the 
trade-off theory predicts that a firm will hold a higher level of corporate cash holdings with 
the presence of a higher level of fixed costs. 
We use a sample of 31645 firms with 262326 firm-year observations from 65    
non-US countries in our empirical analysis. We use the country-level union membership, 
defined as total number of trade union members to the total number of paid employees in a 
country, as our primary measure of the bargaining power of labor unions across countries. We 
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find that firms in countries with higher union membership have less corporate cash holdings. 
The data show that a one standard deviation increase in the country-level union membership 
is correlated with a 0.051 decrease in corporate cash holdings which are defined as the ratio 
of cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets. This corresponds to a decrease in 
corporate cash holdings with a dollar value of 8.61 million dollars. We divide the firms into 
sub-groups based on the characteristics that can affect the bargaining power of labor unions. 
We find that this negative relation between country-level union membership and corporate 
cash holdings is stronger for firms in the countries with weaker employment protection 
legislation, for firms in the countries with a higher degree of labor bargaining centralization, 
and for financially constrained firms. 
To better understand the negative relation between country-level union membership 
and corporate cash holdings, we proceed to examine the market value of corporate cash 
holdings. We find that the market value of corporate cash holdings is lower for firms in 
countries with higher union membership. Moreover, we examine the relation between 
corporate cash holdings and profitability as well as labor costs. We find that the positive 
relation between corporate cash holdings and operating profitability is stronger for firms in 
countries with lower union membership, and that the positive relation between corporate cash 
holdings and labor costs is weaker for firms in countries with lower union membership. 
Furthermore, we find that there are more strikes & lockouts in a country when corporate cash 
holdings are higher in that country. We conduct the robustness check by using the collective 
bargaining coverage rate and find consistent results. 
Our findings are consistent with the bargaining hypothesis, and we conclude that 
firms strategically choose corporate cash holdings to gain the bargaining position with labor 
in the international setting. 
Our paper makes several contributions. First, we contribute to the literature by 
6 
providing the evidence on the bargaining role of corporate cash holdings in the international 
data. Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2015) find a negative relation between leverage and 
employment protection in the international setting, and argue that the results are not 
consistent with the prediction that leverage is used as a bargaining tool. Moreover, they find a 
negative relation between union density and leverage, and argue that this is not consistent 
with the theory of debt as a bargaining tool in the international setting.
3
 Our paper differs 
from Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2015) in that we find the evidence supporting the bargaining 
role of corporate cash holdings in the international setting. Our results provide more 
comprehensive evidence based on a more complete distribution of union density around the 
world, and reveal that corporate cash holdings are used as a bargaining tool not only at the 
lower end of the spectrum (e.g., Klasa, Maxwell, and Ortiz-Molina 2009) but also at other 
parts of the spectrum. 
Second, our findings provide additional evidence which supports the argument 
proposed by Opler et al. (1999) that cash is not negative debt. Opler et al. (1999) argue that 
cash is not negative debt from the perspective of trade-off theory.
4
 Given the difference 
between our findings and the findings in Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2015), it reveals that cash 
is not simply regarded as negative debt from the bargaining perspective in the international 
setting. This is a channel that has not been identified before in terms of the difference 
between cash and debt. 
Third, our research extends the literature on corporate cash holdings in the 
international setting. Among the previous papers that use international data, Dittmar,     
Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) find that the level of corporate cash holdings is determined 
by the degree of shareholder protection from law in different countries, and argue that firms 
                                                 
3
 See Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2015), page 579. 
4
 Opler et al. (1999) state that “…… for a given amount of net debt, there is an optimal amount of cash, and cash 
is not simply negative debt”. (see Opler et al. 1999, page 8) 
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with low shareholder protection cannot make managers disgorge cash. Kalcheva and Lins 
(2007) find that when external country-level shareholder protection is weak, firm values are 
lower when controlling managers hold more cash. Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2010) conduct 
an international survey and find that lines of credit are strongly related to a firm’s need for 
external financing to fund future investment opportunities, and that cash is primarily held as a 
general buffer against future cash flow shortfalls. To our knowledge, no previous paper has 
examined the relation between labor unions, as a type of non-financial stakeholders, and 
corporate cash holdings in the international setting.  
 
II. Hypotheses 
We develop the hypotheses in this section. 
 
Bargaining 
There is an extensive literature on the impact of debt on the bargaining between the firm and 
the labor (e.g., Baldwin 1983; Bronars and Deere 1991; Perotti and Spier 1993; Hanka 1998; 
Matsa 2010).  This literature is built upon the essential rationale that employees will accept a 
lower wage with the presence of a substantial amount of debt, provided that bankruptcy will 
be costly for employees. Consequently, a firm can gain the bargaining position with labor by 
taking on more debts.
5
 
Klasa, Maxwell, and Ortiz-Molina (2009) apply this reasoning to the area of 
corporate cash holdings. They argue that firms hold less cash holdings to improve their 
bargaining position against labor unions, because firms can make it a more credible case that 
the risk of liquidity shortages would even be exacerbated by granting additional concessions 
                                                 
5
 For example, Bronars and Deere (1991) develop a model in which firms use debt to protect the wealth of 
shareholders from the threat of unionization. By issuing debt, firms can credibly reduce the funds that are 
available to a potential union when bankruptcy is costly. Bronars and Deere show that there is a cooperative 
Nash solution where the union will moderate its demand in the face of outstanding debt, and that there is a 
negative relation between the union wage and debt. 
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to the labor unions. As a result, a firm will strategically hold a lower level of corporate cash 
holdings to increase its bargaining position with labor. We expect that this mechanism is more 
likely to occur with the presence of stronger labor unions, because it will be more beneficial 
for a firm to engage in this kind of strategic choice of corporate cash holdings. Therefore, we 
have the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: The bargaining hypothesis predicts that there is a negative relation 
between the strength of labor unions and the level of corporate cash holdings. 
 
Operating Leverage 
Labor unions make wages more sticky and layoffs more costly. This increases the fixed labor 
costs, which results in an increase in a firm’s operating leverage. For example, Chen, 
Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-Molina (2011) find that unionization is positively related to various 
measures of operating leverage. Danthine and Donaldson (2002) argue that fixed labor costs 
are an important source of operating leverage.  
Operating leverage can affect a firm’s corporate cash holdings, because according 
to the tradeoff theory of corporate cash holdings, firms hold more cash when there are more 
expenditures due to the transaction motive. Kahl, Lunn, and Nilsson (2014) find that firms 
with higher fixed costs hold more corporate cash holdings. 
Linking the two streams of literature together, it implies that there is a positive 
relation between labor unions and corporate cash holdings through the impact of operating 
leverage. Similarly, this mechanism is more likely to occur with the presence of stronger 
labor unions, because the increase in operating leverage will be higher with the presence of 
stronger labor unions. Therefore, we have the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: The operating leverage hypothesis predicts that there is a positive 
relation between the strength of labor unions and the level of corporate cash holdings. 
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III. Data and Variables 
In this section, we describe the data and variables.  
 
Data 
This paper uses the international data obtained from the following sources. We get the 
financial data of Canadian firms from Compustat North America database. We get the 
financial data of firms in other non-US countries from Compustat Global database. We 
convert the data in various currencies to the corresponding data in U.S. dollars by using the 
monthly exchange rates from Compustat Global database. We get the country-level data of 
union membership from ILOStat database maintained by International Labor Organization. 
The sample period is from 1992 to 2013. The data starts from 1992 because we need to use 
the data in the prior five years to calculate the industry cash flow volatility, while the data in 
Compustat Global database starts from 1987. We follow the literature (e.g., Pinkowitz, Stulz, 
and Williamson 2013) and exclude firms with less than 5 million U.S. dollars in total assets 
or market capitalization. We also follow the literature and exclude financial firms (SIC codes 
between 6000 and 6999). We exclude the observations with incomplete data. Our final 




Union Membership. We use the variable Union membership as a measure of the 
country-level bargaining power of labor unions. Union membership is defined as the ratio of 
the total number of trade union members to the total number of paid employees in a country. 
A higher level of Union membership indicates that the labor unions in a country have higher 
bargaining power. 
10 
Corporate Cash Holdings. We follow the literature (e.g., Opler et al. 1999) and 
define the variable Corporate cash holdings as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to 
non-cash assets, where non-cash assets is calculated as total assets minus cash and marketable 
securities. 
Control Variables. We include the following control variables. Size is defined as 
natural logarithm of non-cash assets. M/B is defined as market value of equity plus non-cash 
assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is defined as the 
ratio of long-term debts to non-cash assets. Capital expenditures are defined as the ratio of 
capital expenditures to non-cash assets. Dividends are defined as the ratio of dividends to 
non-cash assets. Cash flow is defined as the ratio of income before extraordinary items to 
non-cash assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to non-
cash assets. Net working capital is defined as the ratio of working capital minus cash and 
marketable securities to non-cash assets. Industry cash flow volatility is calculated as the 
standard deviation of the median of Cash flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC 
codes in the prior 5 years.  
We include industry-by-year dummy variables in the regressions. The industry-by-
year dummy variables not only control for time-varying industry effects, but also allow for 
time-varying and industry-specific betas.
6
 We also use country dummy variables to control 
the time-invariant characteristics in different countries. For example, Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, 
and Servaes (2003) include the variables such as shareholder rights as developed by La Porta 
et al. (1997), a dummy variable indicating whether the country has the tradition of common 
law or civil law, the level of external capital as documented in La Porta et al. (1997), and the 
level of private credit as documented in Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000). However, these 
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 We thank an anonymous referee for the suggestion and comments on this point. 
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variables are all time-invariant in different countries. 
7
 It means that we do not need to 
include these four variables as additional control variables in the regression because they 
have already been controlled by the country dummy variables. 
 
IV. Results 
In this section, we describe our empirical results. We start with univariate statistics, and then 
we report the regressions on the determinants of corporate cash holdings. Next, we report the 
results of sub-groups separated by employment protection legislation, labor bargaining 
centralization and financial constraints. Moreover, we report the results on the market value 
of corporate cash holdings and the results on the relation between corporate cash holdings 
and operating profitability as well as labor costs.  Finally, we report the results on the relation 
between corporate cash holdings and strikes & lockouts. 
 
Univariate Statistics 
Table 1 shows the univariate statistics. Panel A reports the univariate statistics of the variables. 
The mean of the variable Corporate cash holdings is 0.2876, and the median is 0.1258.  The 
mean of the variable Union membership is 0.2996, and the median is 0.2279. Panel B 
describes corporate cash holdings and union membership by countries. The mean of 
corporate cash holdings and union membership in a country are reported in the panel. We also 
report the number of unique firms and the number of firm-year observations for each country 
in this panel. Panel B shows that the magnitude of Union membership ranges from 0.0230 to 
0.8316 in different countries. Therefore, it is meaningful to examine the relation between 
union membership and corporate cash holdings in the international setting with a more 
                                                 
7
 For example, the data of shareholder rights in La Porta et al. (1997) for each country in his sample period have 
unique value. It means that this variable will be the same for each year in our sample period for a country. Since 
this is a time-invariant variable, our country dummy variables can control for the impact related with 
shareholder rights. This is the similar situation for the other three variables. 
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complete distribution of union density around the world.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Regressions 
Table 2 shows the regressions on the relation between country-level union membership and 
corporate cash holdings. Column 1 of Table 2 shows the regression for the entire sample. We 
cluster standard errors by firm and year, and report the p–value in the parentheses in the 
tables. We find that the coefficient of Union membership is -0.185 (p-value = .01). It implies 
that firms in countries with higher union membership hold less corporate cash holdings. This 
is consistent with our Hypothesis 1 that there is a negative relation between the strength of 
labor unions and the level of corporate cash holdings because a firm strategically choose 
corporate cash holdings to gain bargaining position with the labor.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
In terms of the economic magnitude, Panel A of Table 1 reports that the standard 
deviation of Union membership is 0.2779. It implies that a one standard deviation increase in 
Union membership is correlated with a 0.051 decrease (= (-0.185) * 0.2779) in the level of 
Corporate cash holdings. Since the median of non-cash assets is 168.86 million dollars in our 
sample, this corresponds to a decrease in corporate cash holdings with a dollar value of 8.61 
million dollars (= 0.051 * 168.86).  
Column 2 of Table 2 shows the country-level analysis. Since we use country-level 
data of Union membership, a country with more firms takes more weight in the firm-level 
regression in the Column 1. We therefore conduct the country-level analysis by giving each 
13 
country an equal weight. We convert all firm-level variables into country-level variables each 
year by taking the average of the variables across the countries. This sample includes 952 
country-year observations. We cluster standard errors by country and year in this column. We 
find that the coefficient of Union membership is -0.146 (p-value = .01). It implies that the 
country-level corporate cash holdings are lower with the presence of higher country-level 
Union membership.  The results are consistent with the firm-level results in the Column 1, 
and support the Hypothesis 1.  
 
Employment Protection Legislation 
Several recent papers on labor and finance have developed their research setting based on 
employment protection legislation. For example, Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2015) examine 
inter-temporal variation in employment protection legislation across 21 countries. They find 
that labor-friendly reforms are associated with a reduction in firm leverage. Bornhall, 
Daunfeldt, and Rudholm (2017) examine the employment protection legislation in Sweden 
and find that employment protection legislation seems to act as a growth barrier for small 
firms. Borisov, Gupta, and Subramanian (2013) exploit within-country variation provided by 
changes in employment protection laws in OECD countries to examine the effect of stronger 
dismissal laws on M&A activity by U.S. firms in these countries. 
We get the data of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) indicator from OECD. 
It measures the procedures and relevant costs of hiring and dismissing employees, as well as 
working contracts. The indicators have been constructed by OECD based on statutory laws, 
collective bargaining agreements and case law as well as contributions from officials from 
OECD member countries and advice from country experts.
8
 A higher level of EPL indicates 
better employment protection. 
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 See the OECD website for more details about the Employment Protection Legislation indicator. 
http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm 
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A higher level of employment protection implies that it is more difficult to fire 
workers. Consequently, it increases the operating leverage. We expect that the impact from 
the perspective of operating leverage as discussed in Hypothesis 2 will be stronger for firms 
in the countries with a higher level of employment protection. This can, at least, offset a 
certain degree of the impact from the bargaining perspective. Therefore, we expect that the 
negative relation between corporate cash holding and union membership is stronger (weaker) 
when a firm is in a country with a lower (higher) level of employment protection.  
We divide the sample into four quartiles. A firm is in a country with highest (lowest) 
level of employment protection if the EPL indicator of that country is in the top (bottom) 
quartile. Panel A1 of Table 3 shows the regression. The coefficient of Union membership in 
Column 1 is -0.378 (p-value = .02) for the sub-group of firms in the bottom quartile with the 
lowest level of employment protection.  The coefficient of Union membership in Column 4 is 
–0.115 (p-value = .01) for the sub-group of firms in the top quartile with the highest level of 
employment protection. We conduct a t-test of the difference in the coefficients of Union 
membership between the bottom quartile and the top quartile, and report the results in the 
Panel A2. We find that the difference is –0.263 (p-value = .01).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
Therefore, the results in Panel A1 and Panel A2 of Table 3 imply that the negative 
relation between corporate cash holding and union membership is stronger (weaker) when a 
firm is in a country with a lower (higher) level of employment protection. This is consistent 




Labor Bargaining Centralization 
The degree of labor bargaining centralization has also been used as a measure of the power of 
collective bargaining in the literature (e.g., Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin 2015). We get the data 
of labor bargaining centralization from the Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, 
Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS) database.
9
 In that database, the 
variable Centralization is an indicator of the degree of labor bargaining centralization in a 
country, which is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1.  
A higher level of Centralization indicates higher power of collective bargaining in a 
country, because a collective bargaining will have a broader impact and will be more 
centrally coordinated in a country. Therefore, we expect that the negative relation between 
corporate cash holding and union membership is stronger (weaker) when a firm is in a 
country with a higher (lower) level of Centralization.  
We divide the sample into four quartiles. A firm is in a country with highest (lowest) 
level of Centralization if the Centralization indicator of that country is in the top (bottom) 
quartile. Panel B1 of Table 3 shows the regressions. The coefficient of Union membership in        
Column 1 is -0.093 (p-value = .01) for the sub-group of firms in the bottom quartile with the 
lowest level of labor bargaining centralization.  The coefficient of Union membership in 
Column 4 is -0.402 (p-value = .01) for the sub-group of firms in the top quartile with the 
highest level of labor bargaining centralization. We conduct a t-test of the difference in the 
coefficients of Union membership between the bottom quartile and the top quartile, and 
report the results in the Panel B2. We find that the difference is 0.309 (p-value = .01).  
Therefore, the results in Panel B1 and Panel B2 of Table 3 imply that the negative 
relation between corporate cash holding and union membership is stronger (weaker) when a 
firm is in a country with a higher (lower) level of Centralization. This is consistent with 
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 The ICTWSS database is maintained by Professor Jelle Visser, and it is publicly available at the following 
website when we wrote the first draft of the paper. The database covers 51 countries with nearly 200 variables 





If a firm is financially constrained, the risk of liquidity shortage stemming from a lower cash 
balance is more credible (e.g., Klasa, Maxwell, and Ortiz-Molina 2009). We expect that the 
negative relation between corporate cash holding and union membership is stronger (weaker) 
when a firm is financially constrained (unconstrained). We follow the literature and use total 
payout as a measure of financial constraints. The variable Payout is defined as the ratio of 
dividends plus shares repurchases to assets.  
We divide the sample into four sub-groups. A firm is most financially constrained 
(most financially unconstrained) if it does not have any payout (if it has the highest payout).           
Panel C1 of Table 3 shows the regressions. The coefficient of Union membership in        
Column 1 is -0.371 (p-value = .01) for the sub-group of firms that do not have any payout. 
The coefficient of Union membership in Column 4 is -0.091 (p-value = .32) for the sub-group 
of firms that have the highest payout. We conduct a t-test of the difference in the coefficients 
of Union membership between the two sub-groups, and report the results in the Panel C2. We 
find that the difference is -0.280 (p-value = .01).  
Therefore, the results in Panel C1 and Panel C2 of Table 3 imply that the negative 
relation between corporate cash holding and union membership is stronger (weaker) when a 
firm is financially constrained (unconstrained). This is consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
 
The Market Value of Corporate Cash Holdings 
To better understand the negative relation between country-level union membership and 
corporate cash holdings, we examine the relation between labor unions and the market value 
of cash. We use the model of Fama and French (1998) to examine the market value of cash. 
17 
This model has been widely used in the literature about corporate cash holdings (e.g., Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Bates, Kahle, and Stulz 2009; Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2007). 
We divide the sample into four quartiles based on the country-level union 
membership. A firm is in a country with the highest (the lowest) union membership if its 
country-level union membership is in the top (bottom) quartile. From the bargaining 
perspective, the market value of cash is higher for shareholders when labor unions are weaker 
because of the lower power of collective bargaining. Therefore, we expect that the market 
value of corporate cash holdings is lower (higher) for firms in countries with higher (lower) 
union membership.  
We use the following equation based on Fama and French (1998). 
       	
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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,                                 
                                                         + ! ," + #$&&, + ' $&&,     
                                                         + ( $&&," + )&*  , + + &*  , 
                                                  +  &*  ," + , -.,   
                                                        +  , -.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 -.," 
                                                  + ! / , + # / ," 
        + '  *	
  ," 
                 + , 
0 ∗ 2  
0 *3	 
                                                         + 
0  
0 *3	 + 4,                                   (1) 
 
The coefficient β1 in the equation (1) is the measure of the market value of an 
additional dollar. For each independent variable, Xt is the level of the variable X in year t, 
divided by total assets in year t. dXt is the change in the level of the variable X from year t-2 
to year t, divided by total assets in year t (dXt = (Xt − Xt−2)/At). dXt+2 is the change in the 
level of the variable X from year t + 2 to year t, divided by total assets in year t (dXt+2 = (Xt+2 
− Xt)/At). Market Value of Firm is the market value of firm, which is defined as the sum of 
the market value of equity, the book value of short-term debt, and the book value of long-
term debt. 
Table 4 shows the results. In the Panel A, the coefficient of Cash in Column 1 is 
18 
1.719 (p-value = .01) for the sub-group of firms in the bottom quartile with the lowest 
country-level union membership.  The coefficient of Cash in Column 4 is 0.930 (p-value 
= .01) for the sub-group of firms in the top quartile with the highest country-level union 
membership. We conduct a t-test of the difference in the coefficients of Cash between the 
bottom quartile and the top quartile, and report the results in the Panel B. We find that the 
difference is 0.789 (p-value = .01).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
Therefore, the results in Table 4 imply that the market value of corporate cash 
holdings is lower (higher) for firms in countries with higher (lower) union membership. 
 
Corporate Cash Holdings and Profitability 
In this section, we investigate the relation between corporate cash holdings and operating 
profitability. If firms hold a certain amount of cash holdings, workers in the countries with 
stronger labor unions may be able to get a larger part out of these cash holdings through 
collective bargaining because of higher bargaining power. Consequently, firms’ operating 
profitability will be lower. Conversely, firms may retain these cash holdings if workers are in 
the countries with weaker labor unions because of lower bargaining power. Consequently, 
firms’ operating profitability will be higher. Therefore, we expect that the contribution of 
corporate cash holdings to operating profitability is higher (lower) when the country-level 
union membership is lower (higher).
10
 
We use ROA as the measure of a firm’s operating profitability. ROA is defined as 
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 There is still a debate in the literature regarding the relation between corporate cash holdings and operating 
profitability. While some papers find a positive relation between cash and operating profitability, other papers 
find a negative relation between them. However, our results do not depend on a general positive or negative 
relation between cash and operating profitability. Instead, our results depend on the difference in the coefficients 
of Corporate cash holdings among the four quartiles divided by country-level union membership. 
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the ratio of earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) to total assets. We divide the sample 
into four quartiles based on the country-level union membership. A firm is in a country with 
the highest (the lowest) union membership if its country-level union membership is in the top 
(bottom) quartile.  
Table 5 shows the results. In the Panel A, the coefficient of Corporate cash 
holdings in Column 1 is 0.040 (p-value = .01) for the sub-group of firms in the bottom 
quartile with the lowest country-level union membership.  The coefficient of Corporate cash 
holdings in Column 4 is 0.003 (p-value = .08) for the sub-group of firms in the top quartile 
with the highest country-level union membership. We conduct a t-test of the difference in the 
coefficients of Corporate cash holdings between the bottom quartile and the top quartile, and 
report the results in the Panel B. We find that the difference is 0.037 (p-value = .01).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
Therefore, the results in Table 5 imply that the positive relation between corporate 
cash holdings and operating profitability is stronger for firms in countries with lower union 
membership. This is consistent with the interpretation that the contribution of corporate cash 
holdings to operating profitability is higher (lower) when the country-level union 
membership is lower (higher). The results are consistent with the Hypothesis 1. 
 
Corporate Cash Holdings and Labor Costs 
In this section, we investigate the relation between corporate cash holdings and labor costs. 
Given a certain amount of corporate cash holdings, workers in the countries with stronger 
labor unions may be able to get a larger part out of these cash holdings through collective 
bargaining to increase their wages and gain more benefits because of higher bargaining power. 
20 
Consequently, firms’ labor costs will be higher. Therefore, we expect that the contribution of 
corporate cash holdings to labor costs is higher (lower) when the country-level union 
membership is higher (lower). 
We obtain a sub-sample of firms whose data of labor costs are available in 
Compustat. This sub-sample includes 72440 firm-year observations. We follow Chemmanur, 
Cheng, and Zhang (2013) and define the labor costs as the average employee pay. The 
variable Average Labor Costs are the ratio of staff expenses to the number of employees. In 
the regressions, the dependent variable is the logarithm of Average Labor Costs. We follow 
Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang (2013) and include size, leverage, average sales per 
employee, market-to-book ratio and tangibility as control variables. We divide the sample 
into four quartiles based on the country-level union membership. A firm is in a country with 
the highest (the lowest) union membership if its country-level union membership is in the top 
(bottom) quartile.  
Table 6 shows the results. In the Panel A, the coefficient of Corporate cash 
holdings in Column 1 is 0.250 (p-value = .01) for the sub-group of firms in the bottom 
quartile with the lowest country-level union membership.  The coefficient of Corporate cash 
holdings in Column 4 is 0.553 (p-value = .01) for the sub-group of firms in the top quartile 
with the highest country-level union membership. We conduct a t-test of the difference in the 
coefficients of Corporate cash holdings between the bottom quartile and the top quartile, and 
report the results in the Panel B. We find that the difference is -0.303 (p-value = .01).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
Therefore, the results in Table 6 imply that the positive relation between corporate 
cash holdings and labor costs is weaker for firms in countries with lower union membership. 
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This is consistent with the interpretation that the contribution of corporate cash holdings to 
labor costs is higher (lower) when the country-level union membership is higher (lower). The 
results are consistent with the Hypothesis 1. 
 
Corporate Cash Holdings and Strikes & Lockouts 
The results in the previous analysis support the bargaining hypothesis. To further investigate 
whether corporate cash holdings are related with the collective bargaining in a country, we 
examine the relation between corporate cash holdings and the country-level strikes & 
lockouts. We expect that if labor unions are more likely to organize collective bargaining 
when firms hold more cash, then there should be a positive relation between corporate cash 
holdings and the intensity of strikes & lockouts.  
We collect the data of strikes & lockouts from the International Labor Organization. 
The data are available for 51 countries in our sample. We construct a variable called                 
Log (Country-level Strikes & Lockouts + 1)
11
, where the Country-level Strikes & Lockouts 
are defined as the total number of strikes and lockouts in a country. We also collect the data 
of labor force from International Labor Organization as an additional control variable. Labor 
Force is defined as the sum of all persons of working age who are employed and those who 
are unemployed. Since the data of strikes & lockouts are at the country level, we conduct the 
country-level analysis in a similar way as the Column 2 of Table 2. We convert all firm-level 
variables into country-level variables by taking the average of the variables across the 
countries. 
We report the results in Table 7. The coefficient of the Country-level corporate 
cash holdings is 0.738 (p-value = .03). It implies that there are more strikes & lockouts in a 
country when corporate cash holdings are higher in that country. Therefore, the results in   
                                                 
11
 We use the Log (Country-level Strikes & Lockouts + 1) because the number of strikes & lockouts in some 
countries is zero. 
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Table 7 support the bargaining hypothesis in that labor unions will organize less collective 
bargaining when firms hold less cash.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
 
V. Robustness Checks 
We conduct robustness checks in this section.  
 
Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate  
The consequence of collective bargaining may apply to the workers who do not belong to 
labor unions. For example, the union membership in France is 7.92%, which is much lower 
than the average union membership in our sample. However, the collective bargaining 
coverage rate in France is 95.8%
12
, implying that most French workers are covered by 
collective bargaining.  In this case, there is a limitation to use union membership as the 
measure of bargaining power, given such a high collective bargaining coverage rate in France.  
Therefore, we use collective bargaining coverage rate as an alternative measure of 
the bargaining power of labor unions. We collect the data of Collective bargaining coverage 
rate from the Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention 
and Social Pacts (ICTWSS) database. The database reports the collective bargaining coverage 
rate in intervals. If the data are not available in a year, we use the data available in the closest 
precedent year as a proxy for the Collective bargaining coverage rate in that year.
13
 The 
variable Collective bargaining coverage rate is defined as the percentage of workers who are 
                                                 
12
 This is the average country-level Collective bargaining coverage rate in France from 1992 to 2013. 
13
 For example, the data of Collective bargaining coverage rate is available for France in 1990, 1997, 2004, 
2008, 2009 and 2012. We use the data of 1990 as a proxy for the Collective bargaining coverage rate in France 
between 1992 and 1996, use the data of 1997 as a proxy between 1998 and 2003, and so on. 
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covered by the collective bargaining agreements, including both unionized workers and        
non-unionized workers.  
We show the results about Collective bargaining coverage rate in Table 8. We use 
the similar specifications as in previous tables. Column 1 of Panel A shows the regression for 
the entire sample. We find that the coefficient of Collective bargaining coverage rate is -0.141 
(p-value = .01). Column 2 of Table 8 shows the country-level analysis. We find that the 
coefficient of Collective bargaining coverage rate is -0.160 (p-value = .01). Therefore, the 
results are similar with the previous tables in that there is a negative relation between 
Collective bargaining coverage rate and corporate cash holdings.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
 
We conduct the test on the market value of cash and divide the sample into four 
quartiles. A firm is in a country with the highest (the lowest) collective bargaining coverage 
rate if its country-level collective bargaining coverage rate is in the top (bottom) quartile. In 
the Panel B1, the coefficient of Cash in Column 1 is 1.655 (p-value = .01) for the sub-group 
of firms in the bottom quartile with the lowest country-level collective bargaining coverage 
rate.  The coefficient of Cash in Column 4 is 0.943 (p-value = .01) for the sub-group of firms 
in the top quartile with the highest country-level collective bargaining coverage rate. We 
conduct a t-test of the difference in the coefficients of Cash between the bottom quartile and 
the top quartile, and report the results in the Panel B2. We find that the difference is 0.712 (p-
value = .01). Our results are consistent with the previous tables in that the value of cash is 
lower in countries with higher collective bargaining coverage rate.  
Therefore, we find similar results when we use collective bargaining coverage rate 
as an alternative measure for the bargaining power of labor unions. 
24 
CPI Deflation 
We use CPI deflated data and conduct the robustness check.
 14
 We get the Consumer Price 
Index data across countries from World Bank.  The variables are deflated to their 
corresponding level in 2010 using the CPI. We find consistent results with the CPI deflation. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
We examine the relation between the presence of labor unions and corporate cash holdings in 
the international setting. We use country-level union membership as the measure of the 
bargaining power of labor unions across countries.  We find that firms in countries with 
higher union membership have less corporate cash holdings. We divide the firms into sub-
groups and find that this negative relationship is stronger for firms in the countries with 
weaker employment protection legislation, for firms in the countries with a higher degree of 
labor bargaining centralization, and for financially constrained firms. Moreover, we find that 
the market value of corporate cash holdings is lower for firms in countries with higher union 
membership. We also find that the positive relation between corporate cash holdings and 
operating profitability is stronger for firms in countries with lower union membership, and 
that the positive relation between corporate cash holdings and labor costs is weaker for firms 
in countries with lower union membership. Furthermore, we find that the number of strikes & 
lockouts is higher in countries with more corporate cash holdings. In addition, we conduct 
robustness checks by using the collective bargaining coverage rate and find consistent results. 
Our findings are consistent with the bargaining hypothesis, and we conclude that 
firms strategically choose corporate cash holdings to gain the bargaining position with labor 
in the international setting. 
  
                                                 
14
 The results are not tabulated for brevity, but are available from the authors upon request.  
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TABLE 1. Univariate Statistics. 
 
Panel A. Univariate Statistics. 
     






Corporate cash holdings 0.2876 0.1258 0.0498 0.2818 0.5471 
Union membership 0.2996 0.2279 0.1822 0.3099 0.2779 
Size 19.0669 18.9446 17.7809 20.2315 1.9077 
M/B 1.5609 1.1638 0.9140 1.6710 1.3113 
Leverage 0.1269 0.0744 0.0012 0.1997 0.1537 
Capital expenditures 0.0707 0.0455 0.0208 0.0823 0.0878 
Dividends 0.0140 0.0000 0.0000 0.0139 0.0335 
Cash flow 0.0102 0.0307 -0.0035 0.0755 0.1733 
R&D 0.0219 0.0000 0.0000 0.0051 0.0870 
Net working capital 0.0133 0.0136 -0.0965 0.1464 0.2257 
Industry cash flow volatility 0.1238 0.0855 0.0535 0.1600 0.0964 
Employment protection legislation 1.8872 1.7024 1.3690 2.3690 0.7291 






TABLE 1. Continued. 
 























Argentina 0.0918 0.3817 60 171 Malaysia 0.1992 0.1026 1022 11010 
Australia 0.4199 0.2141 2000 13690 Malta 0.0996 0.5463 7 57 
Austria 0.2042 0.3413 126 1287 Mauritius 0.0463 0.2566 20 89 
Belgium 0.2325 0.5431 157 1669 Mexico 0.1064 0.1590 124 1803 
Brazil 0.1874 0.2533 363 3018 Namibia 0.1759 0.3043 1 1 
Bulgaria 0.1518 0.1657 30 137 Netherlands 0.1887 0.2165 263 3117 
Canada 0.3566 0.2876 2822 18839 New Zealand 0.1456 0.2173 157 1309 
Chile 0.0949 0.1443 165 1962 Norway 0.3226 0.5435 342 2654 
China 0.3599 0.4574 5807 44077 Peru 0.1272 0.0418 80 538 
Colombia 0.0834 0.1653 36 60 Philippines 0.1959 0.1454 179 1674 
Croatia 0.1056 0.3275 60 288 Poland 0.1620 0.1523 422 2731 
Cyprus 0.1598 0.5296 54 390 Portugal 0.0666 0.2150 75 778 
Czech 0.0976 0.2405 33 210 Russia 0.1440 0.3170 238 1181 
Denmark 0.2855 0.7095 185 1968 Serbia 0.1195 0.2790 4 4 
Egypt 0.2032 0.2750 59 59 Singapore 0.3163 0.1826 758 7009 
Estonia 0.1651 0.0924 17 162 Slovakia 0.0721 0.2556 12 81 
Finland 0.2138 0.7262 157 1987 Slovenia 0.0890 0.3189 28 273 
France 0.2553 0.0792 1017 10171 South Africa 0.2079 0.3381 340 2648 
Germany 0.2809 0.2247 992 10171 South Korea 0.2121 0.1043 1497 8706 
Greece 0.1308 0.2425 269 2633 Spain 0.1129 0.1668 183 2101 
Hungary 0.1389 0.1932 32 307 Sri Lanka 0.1245 0.1423 146 659 
Iceland 0.2072 0.8316 15 94 Sweden 0.2905 0.7411 516 4360 
India 0.1358 0.1753 1693 4764 Switzerland 0.2769 0.1930 276 3628 
Indonesia 0.1627 0.1515 257 1009 Tanzania 0.0972 0.2020 3 3 
Ireland 0.3421 0.3686 126 1450 Thailand 0.1664 0.0292 406 1097 
Israel 0.6136 0.3730 389 1132 Trinidad and Tobago 0.2110 0.2100 11 11 
Italy 0.1658 0.3498 346 3533 Turkey 0.1547 0.0716 273 2425 
Japan 0.2522 0.2012 3866 52109 Ukraine 0.0428 0.6467 8 11 
Kazakhstan 0.1755 0.4233 12 30 United Kingdom 0.3022 0.2935 2783 23899 
Kuwait 0.1631 0.0230 10 10 Vietnam 0.2086 0.1460 189 189 
Latvia 0.0916 0.1640 17 140 Zambia 0.0536 0.0570 7 7 
Lithuania 0.0585 0.1080 37 299 Zimbabwe 0.0759 0.0750 19 19 












TABLE 1. Continued. 
 
Note: This table shows univariate statistics. We use a sample of 262326 firm-year observations from 65 
countries between 1992 and 2013. Panel A reports univariate statistics. Corporate cash holdings are defined as 
the ratio of cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets, where non-cash assets is calculated as total assets 
minus cash and marketable securities. Union membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade 
union members to the total number of paid employees in a country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of non-
cash assets. M/B is defined as market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided 
by non-cash assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to non-cash assets. Capital expenditures 
are defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to non-cash assets. Dividends are defined as the ratio of dividends 
to non-cash assets. Cash flow is defined as the ratio of income before extraordinary items to non-cash assets. 
R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to non-cash assets. Net working capital is 
defined as the ratio of working capital minus cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets. Industry cash 
flow volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the median of Cash flow in an industry classified by two-
digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. Employment protection legislation is the OECD indicators of employment 
protection legislation that measure the procedures and costs involved in dismissing individuals or groups of 
workers and the procedures involved in hiring workers on fixed-term or temporary work agency contracts in a 
country. Centralization is an indicator of the degree of labor bargaining centralization in a country from the 
Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS) 
database. Panel B reports corporate cash holdings, union membership, number of unique firms, and number of 
firm-year observations by countries. The mean of corporate cash holdings and union membership in a country 




TABLE 2. Union Membership and Corporate Cash Holdings. 
 
 Corporate Cash Holdings 
(1) 
 Country-level Corporate Cash Holdings 
(2) 
Union membership -0.185*** Union membership -0.146*** 
  (.01)  (.01) 
Size -0.093*** Country-level size -0.054*** 
  (.01)  (.01) 
M/B 0.027*** Country-level M/B 0.015** 
  (.01)  (.02) 
Leverage -0.186*** Country-level leverage -0.119 
  (.01)  (.12) 
Capital expenditures 0.664*** Country-level capital expenditures 1.074*** 
(.01)  (.01) 
Dividends 3.227*** Country-level dividends 0.246 
(.01)  (.26) 
Cash flow -0.480*** Country-level cash flow -0.297*** 
(.01)  (.01) 
R&D 0.966*** Country-level R&D 1.190*** 
(.01)  (.01) 
Net working capital -0.261*** Country-level net working capital -0.031 
(.01)  (.66) 
Industry cash flow volatility 0.755** Country-level cash flow volatility 0.517*** 
(.05)  (.01) 
Industry * Year dummy variables Yes Year dummy variables Yes 
Country dummy variables Yes Country dummy variables Yes 
Number of observations 262326 Number of observations 952 
Adjusted R2 0.48 Adjusted R2 0.89 
 
Note: This table shows the regressions about union membership and corporate cash holdings. We use a sample of 262326 firm-year 
observations from 65 countries between 1992 and 2013. Column (1) shows the regression for the entire sample. Corporate Cash 
Holdings are defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets, where non-cash assets is calculated as total 
assets minus cash and marketable securities. Union membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union members to 
the total number of paid employees in a country. Size is defined as natural logarithm of non-cash assets. M/B is defined as market 
value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-
term debts to non-cash assets. Capital expenditures are defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to non-cash assets. Dividends are 
defined as the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash flow is defined as the ratio of income before extraordinary items to non-cash 
assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to non-cash assets. Net working capital is defined as the 
ratio of working capital minus cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets. Industry cash flow volatility is defined as the 
standard deviation of the median of Cash flow in an industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. Industry * Year 
dummy variables are the industry-by-year dummy variables for the interaction between the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes 
and the years in the sample, and are not reported in the table. Country dummy variables are the dummy variables for the countries in 
the sample and not reported in the table. We cluster the standard errors by firm and year in Column (1), and report the p-value in the 
parentheses. Column (2) shows the regression on the country-level analysis about union membership and corporate cash holdings. We 
convert all firm-level variables into country-level variables by taking the average of the variables across the countries. The sample 
includes 952 country-year observations between 1992 and 2013. Year dummy variables are the dummy variables for the years in the 
sample and not reported in the table. We cluster the standard errors by country and year in Column (2), and report the p-value in the 
parentheses. 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 




TABLE 3. Sub-group Analysis Based on Employment Protection Legislation, Labor Bargaining Centralization 
and Financial Constraints. 
 
Panel A1. Regressions for the Sub-groups Separated by EPL. 
 Corporate Cash Holdings 
 
EPL < 25th Percentile  
(1) 
25th Percentile ≤ EPL 
< Median 
(2) 
Median ≤ EPL < 75th 
Percentile 
(3) 
EPL ≥ 75th Percentile 
 
(4) 
Union membership -0.378** -0.291*** -0.154*** -0.115*** 
 
(.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry * Year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 67603 48329 31941 48627 
Adjusted R2 0.59 0.65 0.49 0.40 
Panel A2. Difference in the Coefficients of Union Membership. 




Panel B1. Regressions for the Sub-groups Separated by Centralization. 
 Corporate Cash Holdings 
 
Centralization  
< 25th Percentile 
(1) 
25th Percentile ≤ Centralization 
 < Median 
(2) 




≥ 75th Percentile 
(4) 
Union membership -0.093*** -0.183** -0.327* -0.402*** 
 
(.01) (.03) (.07) (.01) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry * Year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 41663 40749 42285 41569 
Adjusted R2 0.58 0.65 0.53 0.64 
Panel B2. Difference in the Coefficients of Union Membership. 




Panel C1. Regressions for the Sub-groups Separated by Payout. 
 Corporate Cash Holdings 
 
Payout = 0 
 
(1) 
0 < Payout < 33rd 
Percentile 
(2) 
33rd Percentile ≤ Payout 
< 67th Percentile 
(3) 
Payout ≥ 67th 
Percentile  
(4) 
Union membership -0.371*** -0.175*** -0.135* -0.091 
 
(.01) (.01) (.08) (.32) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry * Year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 217447 14960 14960 14959 
Adjusted R2 0.48 0.42 0.30 0.44 
Panel C2. Difference in the Coefficients of Union Membership. 








TABLE 3. Continued. 
 
Note: This table shows the sub-group analysis based on various criteria. Panel A1 shows the regressions for the sub-groups 
separated by the employment protection legislation. We use a sample of 196500 firm-year observations from 40 countries between 
1992 and 2013. Corporate Cash Holdings are defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets, where non-
cash assets is calculated as total assets minus cash and marketable securities. Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) is the 
OECD indicators of employment protection legislation that measure the procedures and costs involved in dismissing individuals or 
groups of workers and the procedures involved in hiring workers on fixed-term or temporary work agency contracts in a country. 
Union membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union members to the total number of paid employees in a 
country. The control variables are not reported in the table. We list the definition of the control variables here. Size is defined as 
natural logarithm of non-cash assets. M/B is defined as market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, 
divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to non-cash assets. Capital expenditures are defined 
as the ratio of capital expenditures to non-cash assets. Dividends are defined as the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash flow 
is defined as the ratio of income before extraordinary items to non-cash assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and 
development expenses to non-cash assets. Net working capital is defined as the ratio of working capital minus cash and marketable 
securities to non-cash assets. Industry cash flow volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the median of Cash flow in an 
industry classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. Industry * Year dummy variables are the industry-by-year dummy 
variables for the interaction between the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and the years in the sample, and are not reported 
in the table. Country dummy variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in the table. We 
cluster the standard errors by firm and year, and report the p-value in the parentheses. Panel A2 shows the difference in the 
coefficients of Union membership between Column (1) and Column (4) in Panel A1. We report the p-value of the t-test in the 
parentheses. Panel B1 shows the regressions for the sub-groups separated by the labor bargaining centralization. We use a sample of 
166266 firm-year observations from 31 countries between 1992 and 2013. Centralization is an indicator of the degree of labor 
bargaining centralization in a country from the Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and 
Social Pacts (ICTWSS) database. We cluster the standard errors by firm and year, and report the p-value in the parentheses. Panel 
B2 shows the difference in the coefficients of Union membership between Column (1) and Column (4) in Panel B1. We report the 
p-value of the t-test in the parentheses. Panel C1 shows the regressions for the sub-groups separated by the financial constraints. We 
use a sample of 262326 firm-year observations from 65 countries between 1992 and 2013. Payout is defined as the ratio of 
dividends plus shares repurchases to assets. We cluster the standard errors by firm and year, and report the p-value in the 
parentheses. Panel C2 shows the difference in the coefficients of Union membership between Column (1) and Column (4) in Panel 
C1. We report the p-value of the t-test in the parentheses. 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 








Panel A. Regressions. 
 Market Value of Firm t 
 
Union Membership 
< 25th Percentile 
 
(1) 




Median ≤ Union 
Membership 
< 75th Percentile 
(3) 
Union Membership 
≥ 75th Percentile 
 
(4) 
Cash t 1.719*** 1.251*** 1.114*** 0.930*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Earnings t -1.850*** -1.129*** -0.633*** 0.124*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
dEarnings t 0.875*** 0.951*** 0.726*** 1.580*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
dEarnings t+2 0.375*** -0.669*** -0.378*** 0.133*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
R&D t 0.001 1.627*** 0.853*** 1.098*** 
(.97) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
dR&D t -0.843 3.389*** 2.040*** 3.801*** 
(.78) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
dR&D t+2 2.043*** 3.275*** 2.045*** 2.909*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Dividends t 1.025*** 12.831*** 8.235*** 6.135*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
dDividends t 0.931 1.159*** 0.100 -0.654* 
(.67) (.01) (.75) (.06) 
dDividends t+2 2.502*** 6.225*** 3.316*** 2.145*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Interest expense t 10.381*** 9.429*** 2.610*** 0.614* 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.06) 
dInterest expense t -11.549*** -5.166*** -1.236*** -1.251*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
dInterest expense t+2 -4.485** 1.107*** 0.385** -0.703*** 
(.04) (.01) (.05) (.01) 
dNet assets t 0.066 0.182*** 0.044*** -0.030*** 
(.61) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
dNet assets t+2 1.569*** 0.244*** 0.178*** 0.184*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
dMarket value of firm t+2 -1.029*** -0.027*** -0.011*** 0.001 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.78) 
Industry * Year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 35649 52991 43327 43210 
Adjusted R2 0.40 0.71 0.80 0.81 
Panel B. Difference in the Coefficients of Cash. 








TABLE 4. Continued. 
 
Note: This table shows the regressions about the market value of corporate cash holdings for the sub-groups separated by union 
membership. We use a sample of 175177 firm-year observations from 65 countries between 1992 and 2013. Panel A shows the 
regressions. For each independent variable, Xt is the level of the variable X in year t, divided by total assets in year t. dXt is the change 
in the level of the variable X from year t - 2 to year t, divided by total assets in year t (dXt = (Xt − Xt−2)/At). dXt+2 is the change in the 
level of the variable X from year t + 2 to year t, divided by total assets in year t (dXt+2 = (Xt+2 − Xt)/At). Market Value of Firm is the 
market value of firm, which is defined as the sum of the market value of equity, the book value of short-term debt, and the book value 
of long-term debt. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union members to the total number of paid 
employees in a country. Cash is cash and marketable securities. Earnings are earnings, which is defined as earnings before 
extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits. R&D is the research and development expenses. 
Dividends are dividends. Interest expense is the interest expense. Net assets are non-cash assets, which is defined as total assets minus 
cash and marketable securities. Industry * Year dummy variables are the industry-by-year dummy variables for the interaction between 
the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and the years in the sample, and are not reported in the table. Country dummy variables 
are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in the table. We cluster the standard errors by firm and year, 
and report the p-value in the parentheses. Panel B shows the difference in the coefficients of Cash between Column (1) and Column (4) 
in Panel A. We report the p-value of the t-test in the parentheses. 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 






TABLE 5. Corporate Cash Holdings and Profitability. 
 




< 25th Percentile 
 
(1) 




Median ≤ Union 
Membership 
< 75th Percentile 
(3) 
Union Membership 
≥ 75th Percentile 
 
(4) 
Corporate cash holdings 0.040*** 0.013*** 0.006*** 0.003* 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.08) 
Size 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.029*** 0.018*** 
  (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
M/B 0.003*** -0.013*** -0.009*** 0.006*** 
  (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Leverage -0.058*** -0.053*** -0.078*** -0.060*** 
  (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Capital expenditure 0.071*** -0.034*** -0.052*** 0.158*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Dividends 0.963*** 1.402*** 1.202*** 0.966*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Cash flow -0.178*** -0.144*** -0.161*** -0.359*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
R&D 0.146*** 0.119*** 0.150*** 0.155*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Net working capital -0.182** 0.101 -0.175 -1.376*** 
(.02) (.62) (.17) (.01) 
Industry * Year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 63987 66377 66356 65606 
Adjusted R2 0.30 0.13 0.24 0.15 
Panel B. Difference in the Coefficients of Corporate Cash Holdings. 





Note: This table shows the regressions about corporate cash holdings and profitability for the sub-groups separated by union 
membership. We use a sample of 262326 firm-year observations from 65 countries between 1992 and 2013. Panel A shows the 
regressions. ROA is defined as the ratio of EBIT to total assets. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade 
union members to the total number of paid employees in a country. Corporate cash holdings are defined as the ratio of cash and 
marketable securities to non-cash assets, where non-cash assets is calculated as total assets minus cash and marketable securities. Size is 
defined as natural logarithm of non-cash assets. M/B is defined as market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of 
equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to non-cash assets. Capital expenditures are 
defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to non-cash assets. Dividends are defined as the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash 
flow is defined as the ratio of income before extraordinary items to non-cash assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and 
development expenses to non-cash assets. Net working capital is defined as the ratio of working capital minus cash and marketable 
securities to non-cash assets. Industry * Year dummy variables are the industry-by-year dummy variables for the interaction between 
the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and the years in the sample, and are not reported in the table. Country dummy variables 
are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in the table.  We cluster the standard errors by firm and year, 
and report the p-value in the parentheses. Panel B shows the difference in the coefficients of Corporate cash holdings between Column 
(1) and Column (4) in  Panel A. We report the p-value of the t-test in the parentheses. 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 




TABLE 6. Corporate Cash Holdings and Labor Costs. 
 
Panel A. Regressions. 
 Log (Average Labor Costs) 
 
Union Membership 
< 25th Percentile 
 
(1) 




Median ≤ Union 
Membership 
< 75th Percentile 
(3) 
Union Membership 
≥ 75th Percentile 
 
(4) 
Corporate cash holdings 0.250*** 0.347*** 0.469*** 0.553*** 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Size -0.017*** -0.035*** -0.018*** 0.002 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.64) 
Leverage 0.059 -0.029 0.117* 0.017 
 (.23) (.69) (.09) (.78) 
Average sales per employee 0.380*** 0.583*** 0.443*** 0.552*** 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
M/B 0.027*** 0.002 0.024*** 0.002 
 (.01) (.85) (.01) (.81) 
Tangibility -0.144*** 0.123*** 0.041 0.010 
  (.01) (.01) (.33) (.80) 
Industry * Year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 18071 18272 17897 18200 
Adjusted R2 0.55 0.47 0.42 0.51 
Panel B. Difference in the Coefficients of Corporate Cash Holdings. 





Note: This table shows the regressions about corporate cash holdings and labor costs for the sub-groups separated by union 
membership. We use a sample of 72440 firm-year observations from 62 countries between 1992 and 2013. Panel A shows the 
regressions. Log (Average Labor Costs) is defined as the logarithm of average labor costs, where average labor costs are the ratio of 
staff expenses to the number of employees. Union Membership is defined as the ratio of the total number of trade union members to 
the total number of paid employees in a country. Corporate cash holdings are defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities 
to assets. Size is defined as the logarithm of market value of assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to market 
value of assets. Average sales per employee are the ratio of sales to the number of employees. M/B is defined as market value of 
equity plus assets minus book value of equity, divided by assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to assets. 
Industry * Year dummy variables are the industry-by-year dummy variables for the interaction between the industries defined by 
two-digit SIC codes and the years in the sample, and are not reported in the table. Country dummy variables are the dummy 
variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in the table.  We cluster the standard errors by firm and year, and report 
the p-value in the parentheses. Panel B shows the difference in the coefficients of Corporate cash holdings between Column (1) and 
Column (4) in Panel A. We report the p-value of the t-test in the parentheses. 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
*Significant at the 10% level. 
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TABLE 7. Corporate Cash Holdings and Strikes & Lockouts: Country-level Analysis. 
 
 Log (Country-level Strikes & Lockouts + 1) 
Country-level corporate cash holdings 0.738** 
 (.03) 
Log (Country-level labor force) 1.383*** 
 (.01) 
Country-level size -0.137 
 (.11) 
Country-level M/B 0.083 
 (.21) 
Country-level leverage 3.857*** 
 (.01) 
Country-level capital expenditure 2.043 
 (.23) 
Country-level dividends 7.957*** 
 (.01) 
Country-level cash Flow -1.626** 
 (.02) 
Country-level R&D 1.028 
 (.53) 
Country-level net working capital 0.273 
 (.72) 
Country-level cash flow volatility 0.837 
 (.68) 
Year dummy variables Yes 
Country dummy variables Yes 
Number of observations 759 
Adjusted R2 0.90 
 
Note: This table shows a regression on the country-level analysis about corporate cash holdings and strikes & 
lockouts. We convert all firm-level variables into country-level variables by taking the average of the variables 
across the countries. The sample includes 759 country-year observations between 1992 and 2013 from 51 
countries. Strikes & Lockouts are defined as the total number of strikes and lockouts in a country. Corporate 
cash holdings are defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets, where non-cash 
assets is calculated as total assets minus cash and marketable securities. Labor force is defined as the sum of all 
persons of working age who are employed and those who are unemployed. Size is defined as natural logarithm 
of non-cash assets. M/B is defined as market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, 
divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to non-cash assets. Capital 
expenditures are defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to non-cash assets. Dividends are defined as the 
ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash flow is defined as the ratio of income before extraordinary items to 
non-cash assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to non-cash assets. Net 
working capital is defined as the ratio of working capital minus cash and marketable securities to non-cash 
assets. Cash flow volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the median of Cash flow in an industry 
classified by two-digit SIC codes in the prior 5 years. Year dummy variables are the dummy variables for the 
years in the sample and not reported in the table. Country dummy variables are the dummy variables for the 
countries in the sample and not reported in the table. We cluster the standard errors by country and year, and 
report the p-value in the parentheses. 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
*Significant at the 10% level. 
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TABLE 8. Robustness Check: Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate. 
 
Panel A. Collective Bargaining Coverage Rate and Corporate Cash Holdings. 
 Corporate Cash 
Holdings 
(1) 
 Country-level Corporate 
Cash Holdings 
(2) 
Collective bargaining coverage rate -0.141*** Collective bargaining coverage rate -0.160*** 
  (.01)  (.01) 
Size -0.099*** Country-level size -0.059*** 
  (.01)  (.01) 
M/B 0.082*** Country-level M/B 0.073*** 
  (.01)  (.01) 
Leverage -0.238*** Country-level leverage -0.041 
  (.01)  (.56) 
Capital expenditures 0.683*** Country-level capital expenditures 0.698*** 
(.01)  (.01) 
Dividends 4.422*** Country-level dividends 0.469 
(.01)  (.25) 
Cash flow -0.995*** Country-level cash flow -0.287*** 
(.01)  (.01) 
R&D 4.452*** Country-level R&D 1.546*** 
(.01)  (.01) 
Net working capital -0.419*** Country-level net working capital -0.005 
(.01)  (.94) 
Industry cash flow volatility 0.163*** Country-level cash flow volatility 0.861*** 
(.01)  (.01) 
Industry * Year dummy variables Yes Year dummy variables Yes 
Country dummy variables Yes Country dummy variables Yes 
Number of observations 197176 Number of observations 774 






TABLE 8. Continued. 
 
 
Panel B1. Market Value of Cash – Regressions. 




< 25th Percentile 
(1) 
25th Percentile ≤ Collective 
Bargaining Coverage Rate 
< Median 
(2) 
Median ≤ Collective 





≥ 75th Percentile  
(4) 
Cash t 1.655*** 1.309*** 1.155*** 0.943*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Earnings t 0.912*** -0.625*** -0.014 0.293*** 
(.01) (.01) (.57) (.01) 
dEarnings t 0.510*** 0.429*** 0.091*** 0.035 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.24) 
dEarnings t+2 1.628*** -0.059*** 0.077*** 0.176*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
R&D t 0.154*** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001** 
(.01) (.01) (.08) (.04) 
dR&D t 0.604** 2.741*** 1.761*** 1.231*** 
(.03) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
dR&D t+2 6.226*** 4.426*** 2.544*** 2.005*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Dividends t 5.809*** 2.077*** 0.004 0.075*** 
(.01) (.01) (.47) (.01) 
dDividends t 0.039 0.336* 0.006 0.014 
(.95) (.09) (.74) (.80) 
dDividends t+2 2.978*** 0.996*** 0.179*** 0.315*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Interest expense t 4.687*** 2.026*** 0.503*** 0.255*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
dInterest expense t -2.526*** -0.316*** -0.357*** -0.317*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
dInterest expense t+2 3.087*** -0.087 0.534*** -0.208*** 
(.01) (.39) (.01) (.01) 
dNet assets t 0.229*** 0.374*** 0.355*** 0.270*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
dNet assets t+2 0.457*** 0.115*** 0.058*** 0.010*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
dMarket value of firm t+2 -0.534*** -0.039*** -0.003*** -0.001*** 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 
Industry * Year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 28072 37723 33512 32933 
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.83 0.85 0.88 
Panel B2. Market Value of Cash - Difference in the Coefficients of Cash. 





  (Continued) 
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TABLE 8. Continued. 
 
Note: This table shows the robustness check by using the collective bargaining coverage rate as an alternative 
measure of bargaining power. We use a sample of 197176 firm-year observations from 54 countries between 
1992 and 2013. Panel A shows the regressions about the collective bargaining coverage rate and corporate cash 
holdings. Column (1) shows a regression for the entire sample. Corporate Cash Holdings are defined as the ratio 
of cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets, where non-cash assets is calculated as total assets minus 
cash and marketable securities. Collective bargaining coverage rate is calculated as the number of employees 
whose pay and/or conditions of employment are determined by one or more collective agreement(s) in a country 
divided by the total number of employees in that country.  Size is defined as natural logarithm of non-cash 
assets. M/B is defined as market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by 
non-cash assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debts to non-cash assets. Capital expenditures are 
defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to non-cash assets. Dividends are defined as the ratio of dividends to 
non-cash assets. Cash flow is defined as the ratio of income before extraordinary items to non-cash assets. R&D 
is defined as the ratio of research and development expenses to non-cash assets. Net working capital is defined 
as the ratio of working capital minus cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets. Industry cash flow 
volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the median of Cash flow in an industry classified by two-digit 
SIC codes in the prior 5 years. Industry * Year dummy variables are the industry-by-year dummy variables for 
the interaction between the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and the years in the sample, and are not 
reported in the table. Country dummy variables are the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not 
reported in the table. We cluster the standard errors by firm and year in Column (1), and report the p-value in the 
parentheses. Column (2) shows a regression on the country-level analysis about collective bargaining coverage 
rate and corporate cash holdings. We convert all firm-level variables into country-level variables by taking the 
average of the variables across the countries. The sample includes 774 country-year observations between 1992 
and 2013. Year dummy variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the 
table. We cluster the standard errors by country and year in Column (2), and report the p-value in the 
parentheses. Panel B1 shows the regressions about the market value of corporate cash holdings for the sub-
groups separated by Collective bargaining coverage rate. We use a sample of 132240 firm-year observations 
from 54 countries between 1992 and 2013. For each independent variable, Xt is the level of the variable X in 
year t, divided by total assets in year t. dXt is the change in the level of the variable X from year t - 2 to year t, 
divided by total assets in year t (dXt = (Xt − Xt−2)/At). dXt+2 is the change in the level of the variable X from year 
t + 2 to year t, divided by total assets in year t (dXt+2 = (Xt+2 − Xt)/At). Market Value of Firm is the market value 
of firm, which is defined as the sum of the market value of equity, the book value of short-term debt, and the 
book value of long-term debt. Cash is cash and marketable securities. Earnings are earnings, which is defined as 
earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits. R&D is the 
research and development expenses. Dividends are dividends. Interest expense is the interest expense. Net assets 
are non-cash assets, which is defined as total assets minus cash and marketable securities. Industry * Year 
dummy variables are the industry-by-year dummy variables for the interaction between the industries defined by 
two-digit SIC codes and the years in the sample, and are not reported in the table. Country dummy variables are 
the dummy variables for the countries in the sample and not reported in the table. We cluster the standard errors 
by firm and year, and report the p-value in the parentheses. Panel B2 shows the difference in the coefficients of 
Cash between Column (1) and Column (4) in Panel B1. We report the p-value of the t-test in the parentheses. 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
*Significant at the 10% level. 
 
